MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

DOI10.1111/iere.12592zbMath1530.91210OpenAlexW2756670816MaRDI QIDQ6067127

Pieter A. Gautier, Ronald Wolthoff, Xiaoming Cai

Publication date: 16 November 2023

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12592

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• A note on Peters and Severinov, ``Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
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• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
• Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
• Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
• Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
• Optimal Auction Design
• Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Applications and Interviews: Firms’ Recruiting Decisions in a Frictional Labour Market
• Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

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