Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6067183
DOI10.3982/qe1692OpenAlexW3098110911MaRDI QIDQ6067183
Theo Offerman, Andreas Ziegler, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/qe1692
Related Items (2)
Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions
- Risky procurement with an insider bidder
- The winner's curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Auction fever: rising revenue in second-price auction formats
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK
- Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
This page was built for publication: Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases