Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage
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Publication:6070122
DOI10.1111/itor.12844OpenAlexW3039624243MaRDI QIDQ6070122
Publication date: 20 November 2023
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12844
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Cites Work
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