Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks
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Publication:6072156
DOI10.1002/nav.21912zbMath1529.91019OpenAlexW3036771124MaRDI QIDQ6072156
Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 12 October 2023
Published in: Naval Research Logistics (NRL) (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21912
Cites Work
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- A remark on the customs and smuggler game
- Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort
- Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
- A generalized inspection game
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