A weakness in OCB3 used with short nonces allowing for a break of authenticity and confidentiality

DOI10.1016/J.IPL.2023.106404zbMath1529.94027OpenAlexW4368363404MaRDI QIDQ6072194

Jean Liénardy, Frederic Lafitte

Publication date: 12 October 2023

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2023.106404

zbMATH Keywords

cryptographyauthenticated encryptionforgeryOCB3plaintext recovery

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Tweakable block ciphers
• The design and evolution of OCB
• Foundationalism, probability, and mutual support
• The Software Performance of Authenticated-Encryption Modes
• Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC
• Cryptanalysis of OCB2: attacks on authenticity and confidentiality

This page was built for publication: A weakness in OCB3 used with short nonces allowing for a break of authenticity and confidentiality