Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105677zbMath1527.91020OpenAlexW4380792642MaRDI QIDQ6072232

Tymon Tatur

Publication date: 12 October 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105677

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityrepeated gamesevolutionary game theoryfinite populationsmutation strategiesendogenous mutations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
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• Strategy selection in structured populations
• Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
• The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Conventional Contracts
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS

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