Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
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Publication:6072241
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105700zbMath1527.91034arXiv1812.11775OpenAlexW3122996999MaRDI QIDQ6072241
Fabrizio Panebianco, Paolo Pin, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 12 October 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.11775
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