Equality in legislative bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105701zbMath1527.91084OpenAlexW4384459968MaRDI QIDQ6072242

Kirill S. Evdokimov

Publication date: 12 October 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105701

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenessinequalityGini coefficientequalitylegislative bargainingno-delay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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