Collateral and bank screening as complements: a spillover effect
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Publication:6072246
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105703zbMath1527.91172MaRDI QIDQ6072246
Publication date: 12 October 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
- Lending cycles
- Leverage dynamics and credit quality
- A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations
- Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game
- The Conditional Effects of Market Power on Bank Risk—Cross-Country Evidence*
- How to Sell Hard Information
- Collateral Booms and Information Depletion
- Third-Party Credit Guarantees and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Corporate Loans
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