Private disclosure with multiple agents
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Publication:6072249
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105705zbMath1527.91041MaRDI QIDQ6072249
Publication date: 12 October 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- A commitment folk theorem
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- The economics of data externalities
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- Secure message transmission on directed networks
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- How to share a secret
- Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Theory of Cryptography
- Differential Privacy
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