Information design in optimal auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105710zbMath1528.91037arXiv2010.08990OpenAlexW4385490859MaRDI QIDQ6072258

Xiangqian Yang, Yi-Chun Chen

Publication date: 12 October 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.08990

zbMATH Keywords

information designoptimal auctionbuyer-optimal informationseller-worst informationvirtual value distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
• Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities
• The calculus of variations
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• A note on the continuity of the optimal auction
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

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