Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.001zbMath1200.91265OpenAlexW2125573286MaRDI QIDQ607259

Sudipta Sarangi, Robert P. Gilles

Publication date: 19 November 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

trustsocial networksnetwork formationself-confirming equilibriumpairwise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items

Coalition-proof stable networks, Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks, Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent, Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation: a transition without decay, Building Social Networks Under Consent: A Survey

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