Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
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Publication:607264
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.004zbMath1200.91026OpenAlexW2038413652MaRDI QIDQ607264
Emilio Calvo, Esther D. Gutiérrez
Publication date: 19 November 2010
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2010/0810.pdf
Related Items (14)
A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures ⋮ A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game ⋮ Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions ⋮ New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ On new characterizations of the Owen value ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE ⋮ A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
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