Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.07.001zbMath1200.91090OpenAlexW2111875180MaRDI QIDQ607266

Frans van Winden, Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra

Publication date: 19 November 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=excen_workingpapers

zbMATH Keywords

electoral competitioninterest groupsspatial voting modelswinning set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (2)

A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition ⋮ Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic partial equilibrium model

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation

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