A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems

DOI10.1111/ijet.12306zbMath1530.91255OpenAlexW3168842955MaRDI QIDQ6074886

Youngsub Chun, Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12306

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyindividual rationalitystrategy-proofnesssingle-peakednessslot allocation problemVickrey rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Fair queueing
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Assigning agents to a line
• Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
• Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
• No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
• A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

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