Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems

DOI10.1111/ijet.12321zbMath1530.91244MaRDI QIDQ6074889

Bettina Klaus, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strict coremultiple-type housing market problemsstrict strong Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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• Unnamed Item
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