Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems
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Publication:6074891
DOI10.1111/ijet.12301zbMath1530.91250OpenAlexW3150094570MaRDI QIDQ6074891
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Chun-Hsien Yeh, Min-Hung Tsay
Publication date: 19 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ2102.pdf
Cites Work
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- Multilateral Bargaining
- How to Divide When There Isn't Enough
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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