Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

DOI10.1111/IJET.12256zbMath1530.91465OpenAlexW3011831436WikidataQ109151726 ScholiaQ109151726MaRDI QIDQ6074895

Unnamed Author, Tsaur-Chin Wu, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12256

zbMATH Keywords

labor uniontax compliancepollution tax evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
• Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulb and paper industry in Quebec
• EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance
• A theory of filtered enforcement
• Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?
• Enforcement and over-compliance
• A note on franchising and wage bargaining
• Labour union, entry and consumer welfare
• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• The Bargaining Problem

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