Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation
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Publication:6074900
DOI10.1111/ijet.12308zbMath1530.91262OpenAlexW3124813287MaRDI QIDQ6074900
Publication date: 19 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12308
Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Cites Work
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- Generalized contest success functions
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- EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIZES
- On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
- A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
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