Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation

DOI10.1111/ijet.12308zbMath1530.91262OpenAlexW3124813287MaRDI QIDQ6074900

Unnamed Author

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12308

zbMATH Keywords

homogeneous functionsequilibrium existenceequilibrium uniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions

Cites Work

• Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
• Generalized contest success functions
• On the existence of Cournot equilibrium without concave profit functions
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Cournot equilibrium with convex demand
• Contest success functions
• Existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium: A contraction mapping approach
• Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
• Relative difference contest success function
• Strategically equivalent contests
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIZES
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation