International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
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Publication:6074907
DOI10.1111/IJET.12296zbMath1530.91458OpenAlexW3123582642MaRDI QIDQ6074907
Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow, Shi-Miin Liu
Publication date: 19 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12296
evolutionary gamemutationstochastically stablelong-run equilibriuminternational environmental agreementimitations
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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