Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions

DOI10.1111/ijet.12297zbMath1530.91140OpenAlexW3110863182MaRDI QIDQ6074914

Yukinori Iwata

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12297

zbMATH Keywords

separabilityinequalitycollective choicenominating powersnomination rules ranking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

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• Multidimensional generalized Gini indices
• Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
• Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems

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