Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
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Publication:6075859
DOI10.1145/3613452OpenAlexW2996923187MaRDI QIDQ6075859
Rucha Kulkarni, Jugal Garg, Pooja Kulkarni
Publication date: 23 October 2023
Published in: ACM Transactions on Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/3613452
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