Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry
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Publication:6076312
DOI10.1111/IJET.12339zbMath1530.91194OpenAlexW3209928759MaRDI QIDQ6076312
Nicolas Drouhin, Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin
Publication date: 23 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03378500/file/CwD_1.1_final.pdf
price competitionmonopolistic competitionfree entrysoft capacity constraintChamberlinU-shaped cost function
Cites Work
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