The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts

DOI10.1111/BOER.12333zbMath1530.91283OpenAlexW2972812827MaRDI QIDQ6076774

Unnamed Author, Marco Guerrazzi

Publication date: 17 October 2023

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12333

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic optimal controlout-of-equilibrium dynamicsconsumption smoothingimplicit contract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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• Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators
• IMPLICIT CONTRACTS, LIFE CYCLE LABOR SUPPLY, AND INTERTEMPORAL SUBSTITUTION
• Optimal Development Policies With Financial Frictions

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