Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition
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Publication:6076793
DOI10.1111/boer.12349zbMath1530.91271OpenAlexW3159630982MaRDI QIDQ6076793
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12349
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Cites Work
- On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets
- Royalty licensing
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Revenue royalties
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information
- Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
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