Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
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Publication:6076910
DOI10.3982/te5088MaRDI QIDQ6076910
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Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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