Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
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Publication:6076911
DOI10.3982/te5120arXiv2108.04622OpenAlexW3192028675MaRDI QIDQ6076911
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04622
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