Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents

DOI10.3982/te5105OpenAlexW4385060589MaRDI QIDQ6076915

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Publication date: 17 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5105

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilitymarket designschool choicetwo-sided matchingcollege admissions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Constrained school choice
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Manipulability in school choice
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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