All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof

DOI10.3982/te5111OpenAlexW2964270962MaRDI QIDQ6076917

Jordi Massó, R. Pablo Arribillaga, Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 17 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5111

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferencesdivision problemsobvious strategy-proofnesssequential allotment rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Menu mechanisms
• OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• One-dimensional mechanism design
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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