Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents

DOI10.3982/te5173OpenAlexW4385150598MaRDI QIDQ6076924

Philipp Strack, Ozan Candogan

Publication date: 17 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te5173

zbMATH Keywords

private informationBayesian persuasioninformation designpartitional signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
• Competition in Persuasion
• Extreme Points of Moment Sets
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores
• Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure

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