Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4zbMath1522.91037arXiv2101.04222MaRDI QIDQ6077274

Yoojin Jang, Luca Mungo, Samuel C. Wiese, Alexander D. Scott, Marco Pangallo, Torsten Heinrich, Bassel Tarbush

Publication date: 25 September 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04222

zbMATH Keywords

best-response dynamicsrandom gamesequilibrium convergence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Random extensive form games
• On the structure of weakly acyclic games
• Convergence and approximation in potential games
• Connectivity and equilibrium in random games
• Selfish network creation with non-uniform edge cost
• The efficiency of best-response dynamics
• The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses
• On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs
• On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games
• Potential games
• A note on the probability of \(k\) pure Nash equilibria in matrix games
• The frequency of convergent games under best-response dynamics
• Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games
• Rationalizable strategies in random games
• A classification of weakly acyclic games
• Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games
• Dynamics in near-potential games
• Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games
• Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
• When ``better is better than ``best
• Complexity and Optimality of the Best Response Algorithm in Random Potential Games
• Multiagent Learning in Large Anonymous Games
• Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability
• On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games
• The Probability of a Saddlepoint
• Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games
• The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games
• Complex dynamics in learning complicated games
• The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game
• The probability of an equilibrium point
• Probability of a pure equilibrium point in n-person games
• Learning in games by random sampling

This page was built for publication: Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games