Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00842-7zbMath1522.91150OpenAlexW4367181823MaRDI QIDQ6077280

Kookyoung Han, Jin Hyuk Choi

Publication date: 25 September 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionmoral hazardprivate informationoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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