Auctions with loss‐averse bidders

DOI10.1111/ijet.12189zbMath1530.91218MaRDI QIDQ6077622

Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 18 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionreference dependenceauctionrevenue equivalenceinduced value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Related Items (3)

Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders ⋮ Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players

Cites Work

• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Auctions with a buy price: the case of reference-dependent preferences
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Optimal Auction Design
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

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