Impact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopoly

DOI10.1111/IJET.12175zbMath1530.91331OpenAlexW2884112023WikidataQ57549453 ScholiaQ57549453MaRDI QIDQ6077623

Yasushi Masuda, Tatsuya Kitagawa, Masashi Umezawa

Publication date: 18 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12175

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot duopolyproduct innovationroyalty licensingfixed-fee licensingincumbent innovator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Royalty licensing
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• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival incorporating ad valorem royalties
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• Welfare reducing licensing.
• A comment on ``welfare reducing licensing
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
• Bargaining and delay in patent licensing

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