Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation

DOI10.1111/IJET.12191zbMath1530.91088OpenAlexW3125927925WikidataQ129301219 ScholiaQ129301219MaRDI QIDQ6077634

Chulyoung Kim, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 18 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12191

zbMATH Keywords

persuasion gamecourt-appointed expertevidence distortionlitigation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability
• Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence
• PARTISAN ADVOCATES
• Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes

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