Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud
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Publication:6077839
DOI10.1111/ijet.12244zbMath1530.91228OpenAlexW2994816134MaRDI QIDQ6077839
Publication date: 18 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12244
Cites Work
- Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
- Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
- Ex Post Information in Auctions
- Competitive Bidding with Dependent Value Estimates
- Optimal Auction Design
- On Competitive Bidding
- Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Bidding up, buying out and cooling-off: An examination of auctions with withdrawal rights
- High bids and broke winners
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