Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication

DOI10.1111/ijet.12356zbMath1530.91405OpenAlexW3012598329MaRDI QIDQ6078018

Felipe L. Shalders, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/Galvao_Shalders_02WP.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationcommitmentcentral bank communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Fiscal policy under loose commitment
• Expectation traps and discretion
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy

This page was built for publication: Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication