A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications

DOI10.1080/00036811.2022.2092475zbMath1522.91033OpenAlexW4283393148WikidataQ113853645 ScholiaQ113853645MaRDI QIDQ6079827

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Publication date: 29 September 2023

Published in: Applicable Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00036811.2022.2092475

zbMATH Keywords

existencecontinuum of agentsweak \(\alpha\)-coresocial coalitional weak equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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