Budget-feasible mechanisms for proportionally selecting agents from groups

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.103975OpenAlexW4385462388MaRDI QIDQ6080647

Xiang Liu, Minming Li, Weiwei Wu, Hau Chan, Yingchao Zhao

Publication date: 4 October 2023

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103975

zbMATH Keywords

auctionmechanism designproportional representationbudget-feasibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

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