Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.103990OpenAlexW4385652233MaRDI QIDQ6080654

Giulia Romano, Nicola Gatti, Alberto Marchesi, Matteo Castiglioni

Publication date: 4 October 2023

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103990

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationBayesian persuasionposted price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Cites Work

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• On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
• Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive

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