Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule

DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01464-4zbMath1530.91167OpenAlexW4372401044MaRDI QIDQ6084799

Issofa Moyouwou, Clinton Gubong Gassi, Mostapha Diss

Publication date: 6 November 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01464-4

zbMATH Keywords

social acceptabilitysocial preferencemajoritarian compromise rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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