Citizen preferences and the architecture of government

DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01465-3zbMath1527.91058OpenAlexW3135758111MaRDI QIDQ6084801

Marie-Laure Breuillé, Jean-Marc Bourgeon

Publication date: 6 November 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01465-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets
• Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives
• The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents
• Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy
• Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of theHeiseimunicipal amalgamations
• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
• The Impact of Trade on Organization and Productivity*

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