Only a dictatorship is efficient
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Publication:608534
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.010zbMath1200.91271OpenAlexW2035832647MaRDI QIDQ608534
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Jean-Pierre Benoît
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.010
Related Items (5)
Compromise in combinatorial vote ⋮ Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum ⋮ Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule ⋮ Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
Cites Work
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- On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
- Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
- The paradox of multiple elections
- On the separability of assembly preferences
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
- The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
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