Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.03.001zbMath1200.91032OpenAlexW3013808998MaRDI QIDQ608535

Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

signalingsettlementcase preparationtrial

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Investments as signals of outside options

Cites Work

• A model of efficient discovery
• Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information
• The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
• Weakly Differentiable Functions

This page was built for publication: Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation