Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.010zbMath1200.91124OpenAlexW3125669264MaRDI QIDQ608544

Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d16/d1623-r.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumstrategic market gameslaboratory experimentsadaptive learning agentsminimally intelligent agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

From general equilibrium to Schumpeter ⋮ Sufficiency of an outside bank and a default penalty to support the value of fiat money: experimental evidence

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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