Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control

DOI10.21638/11701/SPBU31.2022.12zbMath1530.91408OpenAlexW4382770081MaRDI QIDQ6085448

Suriya Kumacheva, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 8 November 2023

Published in: Contributions to Game Theory and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.12

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian approachrisk propensitytax controlstructured networktax evasionsmutual collecting of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution

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