On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
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Publication:608545
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.012zbMath1203.91154OpenAlexW2008818149MaRDI QIDQ608545
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.012
Related Items (10)
Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate ⋮ Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment ⋮ The hedgehog's dilemma ⋮ Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space ⋮ Deliberative democracy and electoral competition ⋮ Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence ⋮ Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets ⋮ Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling ⋮ Intensity valence ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
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