A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008zbMath1200.91091OpenAlexW2133748577MaRDI QIDQ608548

Curtis R. Taylor, Hüseyin Yıldırım

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

coordination problemcostly votingfree-riding incentiveunderdog effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) History, political science (91F10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (11)

Participation in fraudulent elections ⋮ Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Welfare-improving misreported polls ⋮ Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment. ⋮ Voting as a signaling device ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting ⋮ Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations ⋮ On the consensus effect

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• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

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