Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
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Publication:608549
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.03.002zbMath1200.91048OpenAlexW3123027909MaRDI QIDQ608549
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.002
finite automatabounded rationalitylimited foresightimperfect recallchain store paradoxreasoning by analogy
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