Bidding in a possibly common-value auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.02.007zbMath1200.91122OpenAlexW1968246376MaRDI QIDQ608552

Yuk-fai Fong, Daniel F. Garrett

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15419/1/bidding.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

model uncertaintysecond-price auctioncommon value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design

Cites Work

• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• Naive Bidding
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding

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